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Abstract
Who blames whom in multilevel blame games? Existing
research focuses either on policymakers' preferences or
their opportunities offered by the institutional structures
in which policymakers operate. As these two strands of
literature barely refer to each other, in this article we
develop an integrated theoretical model of blame-
shifting in multilevel governance systems and assess it
empirically. In line with the first strand, we assume that
policymakers have a preference for shifting blame onto
actors on a different level from themselves. In line with
the second, we suppose that opportunities for doing so
depend on institutional responsibility for policymaking
and policy implementation. We check the plausibility of
our integrated model by examining policymakers' blame
attributions in three cases where European Union
migration policies have been contested: border control,
asylum, and welfare entitlements. We find that our inte-
grated model does better in explaining blame-shifting in
these cases than the isolated models.
1 | BLAME-SHIFTING IN MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE
SYSTEMS
A core feature of modern politics—whether national or international, democratic or autocratic—is
that actors play blame games. They try to “deflect blame by blaming others” (R. K. Weaver, 1986,
p. 385) when policies are contested.1 The question, therefore, is who blames whom in these blame
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games. The most common answer in the literature is that blame games are played between political
parties, especially between parties in government and opposition (Gerhards, Offerhaus, & Roose,
2009; Hansson, 2017; Roose, Scholl, & Sommer, 2018; R. K. Weaver, 1986). For example, in the
United States (US) Democrats blame Republicans for their tax cuts and health-care policies and in
the United Kingdom (UK) the Labour Party blames the Conservative Party for its Brexit policy
(Heinkelmann-Wild, Kriegmair, Rittberger, & Zangl, 2019).
Another answer provided by the literature is that blame games are played between govern-
mental actors and their subordinate agents, especially the bureaucracy (Gilad, Maor, & Bloom,
2013; Hinterleitner & Sager, 2019; Hood, 2011). For instance, government representatives blame
the agencies in charge of public transportation or health care for inadequate services, and
agency managers respond by trying to shift the blame back onto the government (Mortensen,
2016; Nielsen & Moynihan, 2017). So, while Pentagon representatives blamed members of the
Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) for planned disinformation campaigns targeted at allied
countries in the course of the “War on Terror,” OSI officials blamed the secretary of defense
(Schwarzenbeck, 2017, pp. 94–107).
Moving on from blame games between government and opposition or government and bureau-
cracy, a more recent literature points to blame games involving governmental actors located at dif-
ferent levels of a multilevel governance system (MLGS). In the US, state authorities in Louisiana
blamed the federal government, including President George W. Bush, for inadequacies in crisis
management after Hurricane Katrina, while the federal government pointed to the state-level
authorities' own responsibility for crisis management (Maestas, Atkeson, Croom, & Bryant, 2008).
Moreover, when United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions fail, member states repeatedly blame
the UN, while UN officials shift the blame back onto member states for their failure to provide suffi-
cient resources or mandates. In the European Union (EU), the European Commission blamed the
authorities in the member states for violating European standards on particulate matter pollution,
while, in return, some of these authorities criticized EU standards for being too restrictive. Some-
what stylized, two strands can be distinguished in this literature.
The first, preference-focused strand asserts that actors' preferences explain the direction of
blame-shifting in MLGS. It holds that policymakers have a strong preference for shifting blame
onto policymakers from another level of government than the one on which they themselves
are located. This strand of literature can thus explain differences in blame-shifting strategies
among actors located on different levels of a MLGS.2 It can explain, for instance, why national
policymakers tend to shift blame onto EU-level actors such as the European Commission rather
than blaming each other and why the Commission tends to blame EU members rather than the
European Parliament (EP), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), or EU agencies. However, the
preference-focused strand has difficulty in explaining why policymakers on one level do not
always shift blame onto policymakers on another. Why, for example, did German politicians
blame the Greek government for the social disruption that occurred during the implementation
of European rescue programs rather than the European Commission?
The second, opportunity-focused strand argues that institutional structures of policymaking
shape actors' opportunities to shift blame in MLGSs. Thus, actors who are in positions of institu-
tional responsibility for policymaking find it harder to avoid blame than actors who are not
involved in policymaking (or, at least, are much less involved in it).3 Consequently, this strand can
explain why actors with responsibility for a given policy become the targets of blame attributions.
For example, during the “Euro crisis,” Greek politicians repeatedly blamed the EU for the strict
conditionalities they had to fulfill under European rescue programs. However, the opportunity-
focused strand cannot explain why responsible actors get blamed by some actors more than others.
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Why, for instance, does the European Commission, as the watchdog of the European treaties,
refrain from joining the choir of member states blaming the European Central Bank (ECB) for over-
stepping its mandate by purchasing deficit countries' government bonds?
To solve these puzzles, more recent contributions to the literature combine insights from both
strands, opportunity-focused and preference-focused (cf. Mortensen, 2012, 2013a). Drawing on
this literature we developed a model of blame-shifting in MLGSs that integrates the opportunity-
focused and preference-focused literature strands in a theoretically meaningful way (Section 2).
Thus, our model is not formed simply by adding—ad hoc—insights of the two strands together
but offers their theoretically coherent integration. Drawing on theories of bounded rationality, it
suggests that blame-shifting, like any other social behavior, is shaped by a combination of the
actors' preferences and their opportunities. Moreover, it refines core assumptions from extant lit-
erature. Going beyond the opportunity-focused literature, we assume that blame accompanies not
only responsibility for policymaking, but also—and, in fact, mainly—responsibility for policy
implementation. Likewise, going beyond the preference-focused literature, we theorize the stan-
dard assumption that multiple actors from the same level of government share a preference for
shifting blame onto actors at the other levels of a MLGS. While the main contribution of our arti-
cle is thus theoretical, we study blame attributions in the EU to offer an empirical plausibility
probe of our model (Section 3). Using content analysis, we compare policymakers' blame attribu-
tions in three cases where EU migration policies have been contested: (a) the EU's external border
policy; (b) the Common European Asylum System; and (c) EU citizens' entitlement to social ben-
efits in their country of residence. We demonstrate that our integrated model fares better in
explaining blame-shifting in these cases than the isolated models offered by the dominant litera-
ture strands (Section 4). In the conclusion, we summarize our contribution (Section 5).
2 | THEORY: AN INTEGRATED MODEL
To examine who blames whom in MLGS, we suggest a blame-shifting model that integrates the
underlying assumptions from two strands in existing blame-shifting literature. The first strand
focuses on policymakers' preferences as to whom they want to shift blame onto but tends to
ignore the fact that the opportunities for shifting blame to these actors are typically constrained
by institutional structures. The second strand, by contrast, highlights that policymakers' oppor-
tunities for shifting blame to particular actors are often constrained by institutional structures,
but tends to ignore that different policymakers have different preferences with regard to whom
they want to scapegoat. Drawing on the standard assumptions of theories of bounded rational-
ity, we integrate these two strands in a theoretically coherent model. We suppose that, as in any
social behavior, actors' choices regarding whom they shift the blame for contested policies onto
are shaped by a combination of their preferences and opportunities (Elster, 2015, p. 190f.). In
this view, actors assess their opportunities and opt for the one they expect to serve their blame-
shifting preferences best. Therefore, our model specifies the conditions that shape policymakers'
preferences as well as the opportunities they have to shift the blame onto the actors in question.
2.1 | Blame-shifting preferences
Building on the preference-focused literature, we assume that policymakers always have a
strong preference for avoiding blame for contested policies by shifting it onto other actors. If
HEINKELMANN-WILD AND ZANGL 955
policies are publicly criticized, policymakers use presentational strategies. They engage in strate-
gic communication that downplays their own responsibility for the said policies and emphasizes
the responsibility of others. With regard to MLGSs, we further assume that—ceteris paribus—
their position in the system determines their preference for blame-shifting (Gerhards et al., 2009;
Maestas et al., 2008; Mortensen, 2012). We hold that policymakers on each level prefer shifting
blame onto actors on the other level rather than their own. In other words, “where you stand
depends on where you sit” (Alisson, 1969). We expect, for instance, policymakers from member
states to prefer to point the finger at the EU as a whole or at EU actors such as the European
Commission, the European Council, the ECJ, or the ECB rather than at other member state
(MS) actors. In short, they prefer “playing the blame game on Brussels” (Schlipphak & Treib,
2017, p. 355).
There are two mutually reinforcing reasons why, in MLGSs, policymakers prefer to shift blame
onto another level rather than blaming actors on their own level: loyalty and interdependence. Due
to the frequency of their meetings—and other interactions—loyalty among actors on the same level
is often much stronger than loyalty between actors at different levels of government (Bearce &
Bondanella, 2007; Lewis, 2005; Taninchev, 2015). For example, in the EU, the loyalty among mem-
bers of the European Commission or the EP can be assumed to be much stronger than their loyalty
to MS representatives. Their frequent meetings in Brussels, Luxemburg, or Strasbourg create a
mutual loyalty that deters them from shifting blame onto one another, a deterrence that does not
exist to the same extent vis-à-vis policymakers from MS actors (Gerhards, Roose, & Offerhaus, 2013,
p. 125). At the same time, the loyalty among policymakers from MS actors frequently exceeds their
loyalty to EU actors. In particular, MS ministers typically respect each other more than, for
instance, members of the European Commission, let alone the European Parliament. They consider
themselves equals who deserve each other's loyalty (Bull, 1977; Roose et al., 2018, p. 70). This loy-
alty is further strengthened by their frequent meetings inside and outside the EU context. While this
bond tends to deter MS policymakers from blaming each other for contested EU policies, there is
nothing similar to deter them from blaming the EU itself and other actors representing EU actors.4
While this is particularly true for the EU where the low level of loyalty between national-level and
EU-level actors is not really offset by cross-level bonds, for instance within the same political party
(family), it tends to be a common condition of many—albeit not all—MLGS.5
Leaving aside mutual loyalty, in many MLGSs, policymakers from the same level often
depend on one another more than on policymakers from other levels. This deters them from
shifting blame onto each other. For both office-seeking and policy-seeking actors, support from
policymakers at their own level is typically more crucial than support from any other level
(Moynihan, 2012). For example, as MS actors depend on each other for decision making in the
Council much more than on the European Commission (Heisenberg, 2005; Novak, 2013), they
have to exercise more caution in blaming each other than in blaming the European Commis-
sion or other EU actors. They simply cannot afford to upset representatives from their fellow
MSs. Of course, a similar dependence might also deter members of the Commission from
shifting blame onto policymakers from MS actors. However, as Commission bureaucrats
depend much more on their standing in Brussels than on their reputation among MS actors,
they will be even more cautious about shifting blame onto other EU actors than about blaming
MS policymakers when EU policies are contested.
In sum, as a result of their deeper loyalty to, and stronger dependence on, actors from the
same level of government, we expect policymakers in a MLGS to prefer shifting blame onto
actors on a different level of government.
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2.2 | Blame-shifting opportunities
Drawing on the opportunity-oriented literature, we argue that policymakers can shift blame
according to their preferences only when they are able to maintain the “illusion of objectivity”
(Kunda, 1990, pp. 482–483). Whether or not a given policymaker can plausibly deny responsibil-
ity when shifting blame depends on the institutional structures of the MLGS in which the con-
tested policy was made (Hood, 2011, 76, 146–147; Schwarzenbeck, 2015, p. 37). The institutional
structure shapes the opportunities for shifting blame onto actors on another level. Policymakers'
opportunities for blame-shifting are severely hampered if institutionalized policymaking responsi-
bility is obviously located at their own level of government. In this case, policymakers lack the
opportunity for plausible deniability. However, in MLGSs institutionalized policymaking respon-
sibilities are hardly ever obvious; they are far more likely to be complex and thus difficult to com-
prehend.6 Policymaking typically involves a multistage process, in which multiple actors across
multiple levels share responsibility. The EU is a good illustration. Policymaking is divided
between the Council and the EP, acting on the initiative of the Commission. Due to this institu-
tional complexity, not just the general public but even experts struggle to assess the institutional
responsibility for policymaking in the EU (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014, p. 45; León et al., 2018, p. 661;
Rittberger et al., 2017, p. 912). Consequently, like any MLGS, the EU offers policymakers ample
opportunities to shift blame onto actors on other levels (Gerhards et al., 2009; Gerhards et al.,
2013; Hood, 2011, 83, 122; Roose et al., 2016).
However, even in MLGSs such as the EU, policymakers' blame-shifting opportunities are
not unlimited. Not all policymakers have the same responsibility for policymaking. And, the
more that policymaking responsibility is located on their own level, the more difficult it will be
for them to shift the blame for contested policies onto another level (Hood, 2011, 76, 146–147;
Roose et al., 2018, p. 48; Schwarzenbeck, 2015, p. 37). For instance, due to its responsibility for
making agricultural policy, the European Commission will have more difficulty in shifting
blame for policies in this domain onto MS actors than in other domains where its policymaking
competencies are more restricted.
Moreover, as policymaking in MLGSs is always, at least to some degree, shared among
actors located on different levels of government, policymakers' blame-shifting opportunities
depend much more on their institutional responsibility for implementing a policy than on their
responsibilities for making it (Heinkelmann-Wild, Rittberger, & Zangl, 2018; Rittberger et al.,
2017). We suggest that, if a policy requires “on the ground” implementation, the implementing
actors will almost automatically become focal. As those responsible for policymaking are diffi-
cult to identify in MLGSs, the implementer will be the actor most closely associated with the
contested policy and thus will be hard put to avoid blame. Other actors' attempts to shift the
blame onto the implementer are likely to be considered plausible; implementers' own blame-
shifting attempts, on the other hand, are unlikely to be seen as equally plausible. By the same
token, policymakers from the same level as the policy implementer will find it difficult to shift
blame to actors on another level. Thus, if, for example, an EU agency is responsible for the
implementation of a contested EU policy, it will be difficult for EU actors such as the Commis-
sion to follow their preference for shifting blame onto MS actors. Only when contested policies
do not require active implementation will policymakers be unconstrained in following their
preferences for shifting the blame to an alternative level.
In sum, we suggest that policymakers' opportunities to shift blame according to their prefer-
ences are more constrained in MLGSs than the preference-oriented strand in the literature
would have us believe. As policymakers are difficult to identify in MLGSs, actors' blame-shifting
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opportunities will be constrained much more by institutional responsibilities for policy imple-
mentation than by actors' policymaking responsibilities.7 Beyond what the opportunity-focused
strand in the literature suggests, they are only unconstrained when the policy in question does
not require implementation.
3 | RESEARCH DESIGN: TESTING THE MODEL
We evaluate the plausibility of our integrated model by studying the attribution of blame for
contested EU policies. We focus on the EU because it is a textbook example of a MLGS, for
which we derive from our model the following propositions concerning the shares of blame
attributions targeting the EU. We expect the following rank order (see Table 1)8:
• High: The share of blame attributions targeting the EU will be high when the institutional
structures of policy implementation allow MS actors to follow their preference for shifting
blame onto the EU. This will be the case when policies are either implemented by EU actors
or do not require active implementation.
• Medium: The share of blame attributions targeting the EU will be medium when either MS
actors or EU actors are heavily constrained by the institutional structures to pursue their
preferences. This will be the case for MS actors (EU actors) when policies are implemented
by MS actors (EU actors).
• Low: The share of blame attributions targeting the EU will be low when the institutional
structures of policy implementation allow EU actors to follow their preference for shifting
blame onto MS actors. This will be the case when the policy is either implemented by MS
actors or does not require active implementation.
We assess the plausibility of these propositions by comparing policymakers' blame attribu-
tions in three cases of contested EU migration policies. We selected the following cases:
• EU border control: The establishment of the Schengen Zone led to the abolition of inter-
nal border controls in the EU in the 1990s. As a result, a common external border control
system was created and Frontex was charged with implementing it. The EU agency assists
MSs operationally and coordinates joint operations to protect the EU's external borders
(Lavenex, 2015, p. 381). The EU's border control policy was contested by the public. The
main criticism focused on its inability to prevent the deaths of refugees trying to enter the
EU via the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the agency was accused of dealing inappropriately
with refugees. Critics saw EU border control operations as contributing to the death of
migrants either by not doing enough—as a result of their restricted mandate and limited
resources—or by doing too much—by attracting migrants to take the dangerous route
across the Mediterranean.
TABLE 1 Shares of blame attributions targeting the EU—expected rank order
EU implementation MS implementation No implementation
MS actors' attributions High Medium High
EU actors' attributions Medium Low Low
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• EU asylum system: With the elimination of internal border controls in the Schengen Zone,
the EU established the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Its cornerstone, the
“Dublin system,” stipulates that the MS in which an asylum seeker first enters the EU is
responsible for his or her asylum claim (Lavenex, 2015, p. 381). The CEAS was contested by
the European public. Among other things, it was criticized for overburdening MSs on the
EU's external border while privileging members that do not have external EU borders.
Another critique was that discrepancies in the treatment of asylum seekers persisted despite
common EU standards. Moreover, “Dublin” was criticized for creating incentives for MSs
receiving first entry asylum seekers to refrain from registering them and thus apply a “wave-
through approach.”
• EU welfare entitlements: According to the European common market programme, EU cit-
izens have the right to take residence in any MS without being denied the welfare entitle-
ments provided in their country of residence. Thus, MSs cannot limit social benefits only to
their own nationals. The EU welfare entitlement policy therefore does not require active
implementation, but policymakers are obliged to refrain from direct political intervention
leading to discrimination against EU citizens (Leibfried, 2015, p. 279 f.). This policy of wel-
fare entitlements within the EU was heavily criticized by the public for enabling so-called
“welfare migration” and “social tourism.”
We selected the three aforementioned cases according to the logic of a most similar case
design (Przeworski & Teune, 1982, p. 32f.). While certainly dissimilar in some respects, the three
cases are similar inasmuch as they belong to the same policy field of the EU's migration regime.
The cases are thus intimately linked to the EU principles of free movement across internal bor-
ders and the establishment of a common external border. Their underlying policymaking struc-
tures are also similarly complex. Following a proposal by the Commission, the Council decided
in all three cases on a policy in which the EP would be involved either through co-decision or
consultation procedures. While not amounting to a quasi-experimental design, the similarities
between the cases allow these confounding variables to be controlled and thus help us in sin-
gling out the effect of the independent variables.
As required in a most similar case design, the scores of the independent variables—namely
policymakers' blame-shifting preferences and blame-shifting opportunities—differ in the three
cases. Blame-shifting preferences vary within each case because the three cases allow for the
assessment of blame attributions by both EU and MS actors. Furthermore, blame-shifting
opportunities vary across cases, because the cases differ systematically with regard to the struc-
tures of policy implementation: EU border control policies are implemented by an EU actor
(i.e., Frontex); the EU asylum system is implemented by MS actors; and the EU welfare entitle-
ment policy does not require any active implementation. While controlling for confounding var-
iables, the variance in the cases' independent variables allows for the evaluation of their
assumed effect on the dependent variable, that is, the direction of policymakers' blame
attributions.
To assess these attributions in the three cases, we engaged, as is common in the literature,9
in content analysis of the media coverage of the three contested EU migration policies.10 We
examined the coverage provided by nine European quality newspapers for the 6-year period
between 2010 and 2016. We included in the analysis two leading quality newspapers in Austria
(Die Presse, Der Standard), Germany (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung),
Ireland (The Irish Times, The Irish Examiner), and the UK (The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph).
On the basis of the authors' language proficiency and the accessibility of the newspapers,
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all those selected are from Northern and Central European countries. Therefore, blame
attributions targeting Eastern or Southern European countries' migration policies may be
overrepresented in our sample. To be able to control for this potential bias, we added one
quality newspaper with a pan-European reach (The European Voice/Politico Europe). Over-
all, this selection of nine newspapers (not countries!) aims to approximate blame attribu-
tions in the European press.
To single out articles covering the three cases of contested EU migration policies, we con-
ducted keyword searches in digital newspaper archives (see Appendix Table S1). Given that we
wanted to identify, as far as possible, all articles covering our cases, we used fairly unrestrictive
search strings based on broad keywords. The results of the keyword search were reviewed man-
ually to sort out articles that did not address the respective policy as well as articles that did not
hint at any contestation of the policy. Only in the asylum case, where the original search string
led to a sample size unfeasible for qualitative content analysis, did we add the keyword “prob-
lem” in order to reduce the sample size while, at the same time, deselecting (irrelevant) articles
that did not cover any contestation of the policy, before reviewing the articles manually.
In our final sample of 1.040 articles covering the contestation of the three policies, we
searched for policymakers' blame attributions, which were identified based on the following
criteria11:
• Blame object, that is, a contested policy for which blame is attributed. For the purpose of
this article, we define EU policies as contested if they are publicly discussed as failures. While
the perception of failure does not have to be consensual, it has to be widespread among the
general public, and thus frequently referred to as such in the respective media coverage.
• Blame sender, that is, an actor who attributes blame for a contested policy. For the purpose
of this article, we focus on policymakers, who we define as actors who are involved in the
making and/or implementation of the respective EU policy. We differentiate between two
types of policymakers, namely EU actors (the Commission, the Council, and the European
Parliament) and MS actors (EU MS governments).
• Blame target, that is, the actors to whom blame is attributed. For the purpose of this article,
we focus on actors who participate in the making or implementation of the contested policy.
Blame targets are categorized according to their position in the EU MLGS as actors at EU-
level or at national-level.
In our samples, we identified 480 blame attributions.12 To assess whether they corroborated
the expectations of our blame-shifting model,13 we calculated for each blame sender (EU or MS
actor) and for each case (border control, asylum system, welfare entitlements) the share of
blame attributions that targeted EU actors and MS actors, respectively.
4 | EMPIRICS: BLAME ATTRIBUTIONS FOR CONTESTED
EU MIGRATION POLICIES
To assess our blame-shifting model empirically, we studied the blame attributions by EU and
MS actors in three cases of contested EU migration policies. In the following sections, we will
discuss for each individual case whether the share of policymakers' blame attributed to EU-level
and national-level actors conforms to the expectations of our model. We will then proceed by
comparing the findings across cases.
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4.1 | EU border controls
Whom do policymakers blame for the perceived failure of the EU border control regime? Corrob-
orating our predictions, we find that the bulk of MS actors' blame attributions (n = 65) are
targeted at the EU-level (77%) while only a small minority of statements attribute blame to the
national-level (23%). Hence, MS representatives predominantly blame actors at the EU-level. For
example, Italian Interior Minister Roberto Maroni claimed: “The EU is doing absolutely nothing
and is too slow and bureaucratic” (cited by Agnew, 2011, p. 12). Similarly, former French Presi-
dent François Hollande reportedly noted that Frontex's missions “led more and more migrants to
cross the Mediterranean” (Marlowe, 2015, p. 10) and the British Foreign Office Minister, Joyce
Anelay, criticized Frontex for its operation Triton, which, she claimed, acted as “an unintended
‘pull factor’, encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and thereby lead-
ing to more tragic and unnecessary deaths” (Travis, 2014). By contrast, statements by MSs blam-
ing national actors are rather rare. One of the very few examples is a comment made by Italian
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi who “issued a harsh criticism of his European partners for not
assisting Italy [in securing the EU's borders]” (Kirchgaessner, Traynor, & Kingsley, 2015).
In line with our expectations, EU actors' blame attributions are more divided: they attribute
responsibility for policy failures to the EU-level in 36% of their blame statements (n = 47) while
in 64% of them they target the national-level. Hence, in a comparatively more narrow majority
of blame attributions EU actors' blame is targeted at MSs, as when Commissioner Dimitris
Avramopoulos claimed: “Frontex is not a European border-protection system. If we want one
we will have to build one. […] Building an EU coastguard is something which member states
are not ready to countenance” (cited by Panichi, 2015). In a sizeable minority of cases, EU
actors target the EU-level. For instance, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) blamed
the Council by stating that its “political will lags behind reality”14 and describing its actions as
“empty lip service and crocodile tears.”15 Similarly, High Representative Federica Mogherini
noted: “With this latest tragedy […] we have no more excuses, the EU has no more excuses”
(cited by Kirchgaessner et al., 2015).
4.2 | EU asylum system
Whom do policymakers blame for the failure of the CEAS? In this instance (n = 59), as
expected, EU actors attribute blame predominantly to MS authorities (93%), with only a very
small minority of attributions directed at the EU-level (7%). For instance, Commission Presi-
dent Jean-Claude Juncker reportedly “complained that national governments were failing to
observe agreements on asylum procedures” (M. Weaver, 2015a). EU Commissioner Cecilia
Malmström “accused EU governments of […] failing to protect refugees from North Africa”
(Watt, 2011, p. 10). MEP Sylvie Guillaume described certain MSs' asylum systems as a “cata-
logue of the worst […] practices” (cited by The Irish Examiner 2013). Among the few blame attri-
butions made by EU actors against other EU-level actors, President of the Council Donald
Tusk—“in a barb directed at […] Jean-Claude Juncker” (M. Weaver, 2015b)—stated: “We need
to correct our policy of open doors and windows.”
In line with our expectations, the share of MS actors' blame attributions targeting the EU is
somewhat higher. While the majority of MS actors' blame attributions (n = 228) are targeted at
MS authorities (80%), a significant minority still target actors at the EU-level (20%). For
instance, taking aim at Hungary, the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius condemned the
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“scandalous” and “extremely harsh” conditions asylum seekers entering the country were sub-
jected to: “Hungary is not respecting Europe's common values” (cited by McLaughlin, 2015a,
p. 8). Furthermore, the Austrian and German Foreign Ministers reportedly “accuse[d] the gov-
ernment in Rome of committing a breach of the Dublin II agreement, according to which the
country responsible for a refugee is the one in which he first sets foot on European soil: Italy
[…] would simply allow the refugees to move north instead” (Die Presse 2014b; authors' transla-
tion). Additionally, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán reportedly “accused the German
chancellor […] of triggering a surge of migrants to Europe by making Syrians exempt from the
EU's so-called Dublin rules” (McLaughlin, 2016, p. 4) and “blamed Germany for encouraging
people to risk their lives coming to Europe with its promise of more places for refugees”
(Khomami, 2015). By contrast, for MSs to blame actors at the EU-level is comparatively rare.
For instance, Orbán's chief of staff criticized “the policies […] of the European Commission,
according to which anybody should be allowed into the territory of the European Union” (cited
by McLaughlin, 2015b, p. 9). Furthermore, UK Home Secretary Theresa May reportedly stated
that “the failings of a ‘broken European migration system’ were exacerbated by passport-free
travel through much of the bloc” (McLaughlin, 2015a, p. 8).
4.3 | EU Welfare Entitlements
Whom do policymakers blame for the allegedly excessive amount of “social tourism” facilitated
by the EU's welfare entitlement policy? In line with our model, among MS actors blame
(n = 55) was attributed predominantly to the EU-level (87%). For example, Horst Seehofer, the
chairman of the German co-governing party CSU, reportedly “blamed the EU Commission for
the migration problem” (Die Presse, 2014a; authors' translation). Similarly, UK Prime Minister
David Cameron claimed that “he shared the deep concerns of many people in Britain at the
EU's requirement to lift transitional controls on Romanians and Bulgarians in January”
(Mason, 2013). By contrast, only a small minority of MS actors' blame attributions targeted the
national-level (13%). German Chancellor Angela Merkel did, however, accuse MSs of bringing
the problems of so-called “welfare migration” on themselves. She was cited as saying that “there
was a need for legislation but […] this would mainly be at the national-level” (Sparrow & Owen,
2015).
Corroborating the expectations of our model, EU actors' blame attributions (n = 26) are,
with only one exception, targeted at MSs (96%). For example, Commissioner Viviane Reding
reportedly stated, “that only Britain was to blame for any abuses of the benefit system by
European nationals […] [and that] any abuse of benefits by European Union migrants is the
fault of the Government which pays out too much” (Waterfield, 2013, p. 12). MEP Manfred
Weber likewise blamed the UK: “We need more honesty in Britain. In the course of EU enlarge-
ment, it has waived the transitional period of seven years. That is why there are so many citi-
zens from Eastern Europe there today. That was a decision taken in London, not in Brussels.”
(cited by Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2015, p. 7; authors' translation).
4.4 | Comparing cases
Policymakers' blame attributions in the three cases of contested EU migration policies indicate
that our integrated model provides a plausible account of multilevel blame games. The
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combination of policymakers' preferences and their institutional opportunities for attributing
blame is not only able to explain the attributions we observed across blame senders within each
of the three cases, but also those of each blame sender across the three cases (see Table 2).
As expected, the share of blame attributions targeting the EU is high when the institutional
structures of policy implementation allow MS actors to follow their preference for shifting
blame onto the EU: MS actors attributed the bulk of blame to the EU in the border control case
(77%), where the policy was implemented by EU actors, and in the welfare entitlement case
(87%), where the policy does not require active implementation. Furthermore, as expected, the
share of blame attributions targeting the EU is medium when policies are implemented by
actors located on the same level of government as the blame sender: EU actors' blame attribu-
tions in the border control case were moderate with 36% targeting EU actors. Even MS actors'
blame attributions in the asylum system case, with 20% blaming EU actors, are generally in line
with our expectations. Finally, as expected, the share of blame attributions targeting the EU is
low when the institutional structures of policy implementation allow EU actors to follow their
preference for shifting blame onto MS actors. Only a few blame attributions by EU actors
targeted other EU-level actors in the asylum system case (7%), where the policy is implemented
by MSs, as well as in the welfare entitlements case (4%), where the policy does not require
active implementation.
However, the share of MS actors' blame attributions to the EU in the asylum system case
(20%) is clearly lower than the EU actors' attributions in the border control case (36%). Never-
theless, blame attributions are higher than in any of the cases in which our model predicts the
share of blame to the EU to be low. All observed shares of blame attributions targeting the EU
thus corroborate the expected rank order. Our model might even offer an explanation of why
EU actors' blame attributions to actors at the EU-level in the border control case were higher
than those of MS actors' in the asylum system case. As our theory assumes that loyalty and
interdependence shape policymakers' blame-shifting preferences, a lower level of loyalty and
interdependence among MS actors than among EU actors would explain this difference: MS
actors' preference for shifting blame onto actors on another level of government rather than
their own might be less strong than in the EU actors' case.
We acknowledge that the inferences from these results are limited. However, the purpose of
this plausibility probe was to assess whether the shares of blame attributions targeting the EU
that we observed empirically matched the rank order predicted by our integrated model. And
the empirical results do indeed corroborate our theoretical propositions. They also match our
theoretical expectations when comparing the data from the eight national newspapers and the
pan-European one (Politico Europe/European Voice) from which we drew our sample of blame
attributions. Despite minor differences, the rank orders are the same and in line with our model



















Note: The percentages represent the share of blame statements targeting the EU. In parentheses the absolute number of
statements targeting the EU is compared to the number of statements blaming MS actors.
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(see Table S4 in the Appendix). We are thus confident that the results are not driven by our
selection of predominantly North and Central European newspapers.
Moreover, the shares of blame attributions targeting EU actors within the cells of Table 2
differ quite significantly from the null hypothesis of an equal distribution of shares across cells.
Our confidence that the null hypothesis is wrong is further increased by a chi-square test and
the contingency coefficient we calculated in the Appendix (see also Appendix Table S5). While
the chi-square test demonstrates that the null hypothesis of a random match can be rejected
(99% confidence level), the contingency coefficient implies that there is a meaningful relation-
ship between the dependent variable and the independent variables.
5 | CONCLUSION
The analysis of policymakers' blame attributions in three cases of contested EU migration poli-
cies lends support to our blame-shifting model. This support is further strengthened as this inte-
grated model does better at explaining the observed shares of blame attribution than the
isolated models offered by the dominant strands in the literature.
The preference-focused literature expects the shares of blame attributions by EU and MS
actors to vary mainly across the two types of policymakers: national governments shift blame
onto the EU-level while EU actors blame actors at the national-level. Thus, the distribution of
blame should be similar throughout the rows in Table 2. This is not what we observed: MSs'
blame attributions targeting the EU vary between 20% in the asylum system case and 87% in
the welfare entitlement cases (top row). Similarly, instances in which EU actors blame the EU
range from 4% in the welfare entitlements case to 36% in the border control case (bottom row).
The opportunity-focused literature assumes that the structure of policymaking and imple-
mentation shapes the shares of EU and MS actors' blame attributions. Since policymaking was
constant across the three cases, the implementation structure would, accordingly, be expected
to shape policymakers' blame attributions. Hence, the distribution of blame should be similar
throughout the columns in Table 2. This is not what we see: in the border control case, attribu-
tions blaming the EU vary between 77 % and 36% (column 1), and from 87% to 4% in the wel-
fare entitlement case (column 3). At 20% and 7%, attributions targeting the EU are only roughly
similar in the asylum system case (column 2).
In sum, our integrated model does better at explaining the shares of blame attributions in
the three cases of EU migration policies than the explanations offered by the existing literature
strands. The observed blame attributions in the three cases thus add plausibility to our theoreti-
cally coherent integration of the opportunity- and preference-focused literature strands. On the
one hand, our model highlights that, due to their loyalty and interdependence, policymakers
located on the same level of government tend to share a preference for shifting blame for con-
tested policies onto actors on another level. On the other hand, the model underlines that, due
to the complexity of policymaking, policymakers' opportunities to shift blame according to their
preferences are typically constrained by the prevalent structures of policy implementation.
Together, these specific preferences and opportunities explain why multilevel blame games
deviate from the well-known blame games between government and opposition or government
and the bureaucracy.
However, as we have provided only a plausibility probe based on three cases of EU migra-
tion policies, more rigorous empirical testing of our model is needed. The model still has to
demonstrate its explanatory power in policy fields beyond migration such as trade, finance and
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the environment. Moreover, the assumption should be tested that EU actors' preference for
shifting blame onto the national-level holds independent of their nationality (Southern
vs. Northern), function (Commissioner or MEPs) and party orientation (left vs. right). In addi-
tion, it might be interesting to explore the conditions under which actors blame specific EU
actors such as the Commission and when they target “the EU” more generally. Perhaps even
more importantly, the model still has to prove its applicability to the MLGSs of federal states
such as Germany and international organizations such as the UN. Is it true beyond the EU that
loyalties and interdependencies among actors of the same level tend to be stronger than loyal-
ties and interdependencies that link actors across different levels of government (for instance
when they are members of the same political party)? While the application of the model to
other issue areas and other MLGSs might prompt its modification, we are, nevertheless, confi-
dent that it contributes to a better understanding of blame attributions in MLGSs.
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1 Sometimes political actors even create new actors to whom they delegate policy tasks so that they can shift the
blame onto them in cases of policy contestation (Hood, 2011; Mortensen, 2016; Tallberg, 2002).
2 Gerhards et al. (2009), Hobolt and Tilley (2014), pp. 100–119, Kumlin (2011), Maestas et al. (2008), Mortensen
(2012), Roose, Scholl, and Sommer (2016), and Schlipphak and Treib (2017).
3 Alcañiz and Hellwig (2011), Anderson (2000), Arceneaux (2006), Cutler (2008), De Vries, Edwards, and
Tillman (2011), Gailey (2013), Gailey and Lee (2005), Hamilton (1986), Hellwig and Samuels (2008), Hobolt
and Tilley (2014), Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci (2013), León (2011, 2012, 2018), León, Jurado, and Garmendia
Madariaga (2018), León and Orriols (2016), Malhotra and Kuo (2008), Mortensen (2013a, 2013b), Nollkaemper
(2018), Powell and Whitten (1993), Rittberger, Schwarzenbeck, and Zangl (2017), Rudolph (2003), and Wilson
and Hobolt (2015).
4 Moreover, EU actors are the ideal scapegoats for MSs' blame-shifting strategies, as they are both less willing
and less able to advocate for themselves than their fellow MS actors. On the one hand, as EU actors—
especially the Commission and the Council, though not the Parliament—are much less dependent on voter
support than national governments or parliaments, they are less likely to try to shift blame back onto MS
actors. Thus, in contrast to their national counterparts, they are more willing to accept the blame shifted onto
them. On the other hand, as they suffer from the absence of a European public sphere, EU actors are less able
to shift blame back onto MSs. National governments are usually able to make their positions clear to their
national publics; EU actors typically have a harder time communicating to the publics of the MSs (Gerhards
et al., 2009, p. 550).
5 In domestic MLGSs party loyalty across levels is typically stronger than in the EU and might, at times, over-
write loyalty among actors from the same level. We thus acknowledge that for domestic MLGSs the resulting
loyalty conflicts should be theorized when adding complexity to our—so far—parsimonious model.
6 See endnote 3.
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7 Implementing actors—or actors on the level that has the responsibility to implement policy—might still try to
follow their preference for blaming another level of government. Yet, they are likely to learn that their blame
attributions lack the required plausibility and to adjust their attributions accordingly.
8 Nota bene, conceptually our propositions are concerned with relative ranks (and thus a rank order) rather
than absolute shares of blame attributions targeting the EU. We thus do not expect high, medium and low
shares (which could be defined in fixed percentages) but comparatively higher and lower shares (which are
defined in higher and lower percentages). Yet, for reasons of convenience and comprehensibility, we use sub-
stantive labels for the ranks and dub them “high,” “medium” and “low.”
9 For example, Gerhards et al. (2009), Rittberger et al. (2017), and Schwarzenbeck (2017).
10 We opted for an analysis of blame attributions in quality newspapers rather than in policymakers' speeches
(or press releases) to make sure that we studied attributions that made it to the general public.
11 In the Appendix, we provide the detailed coding rules (see also, Appendix Table S2). To ensure reliability, we
also conducted an intercoder test between the two coders and calculated their concordance (see Appendix
Table S3).
12 The coded data is available at: https://data.ub.uni-muenchen.de/169/
13 Nota bene, we only speak of blame-shifting, if the distribution of blame attributions (across actors and cases)
follows the expectations of our model. If our model is falsified, policymakers would still attribute blame, but
they would not be following a blame-shifting logic.
14 Othmar Karas, MEP, cited by Gabriel (2015); authors' translation.
15 Rebecca Harms, MEP, cited by Bremer (2013, p. 1); authors' translation.
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